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2. 3.	Preparations for Viet Minh attack reported (page 3). London seriously concerned over Malayan situation (page 4).
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London seriously concerned over Malayan situation:	
Officials in the Colonial Office state that Colonial Secretary Lyttelton's forthcoming visit to Malaya is prompted by concern over the failure of the latest guerrilla-suppression program to produce results commensurate with the cost, and by the demands of local authorities for broader emergency powers. Since a major turnover of ranking officials is in prospect, Lyttelton wishes to consult with the retiring officials on the spot.	al
Malcolm MacDonald's term of office as Commissioner General in Southeast Asia expires next May and probably will not be renewed in view of Churchill's known distrust of him.	
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The Viet Minh will probably attack some point

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			NEAR EAST	
1	Egyptian Ministe	r of Interior	indicates interest in Middle East Comman	<u>a:</u>
			The Egyptian Minister of Interior, who is also the politically powerful Secretary Gene	ral
			of the Wafd Party, has informed the US Am	
Ŋ	Widdle East Com		sador in Cairo that Egypt could accept the certain conditions.	
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i	ncluding Americ	e year, leav an as well a	. British forces must evacuate Egypt within ving only a limited number of technicians, as British personnel. In addition, airplanes must be Egyptian, even if flown by British	5
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		e e	EASTERN EUROPE			
	6.	Current Dutch p	osition imperils Yugoslav finances:			
25X1			Dutch officials have rejected a Yugoslav request to postpone the initial payment on a six million guilder (approximately 1.5 million dollars) debt from the summer of 1952 to 1954.			
		privately to US of summer if the Y	Comment: Dutch diplomats have indicated officials that there is some hope for a postponement next rugoslav balance of payments deficit is still serious.			
		a debt readjustm	A final Dutch refusal would set an unfavor- For, unless Yugoslavia's European creditors agree to nent, a significant portion of tripartite aid funds, amount- m of 125 million dollars, will be dissipated in the form a 60 million dollar Yugoslav debt to Austria, Belgium and ny.			
		WESTERN EUROPE				
	7.	British request	broadening of military aid criteria:			
	25X1		The British Defense Ministry has asked the US Military Assistance Advisory Group in London whether the military aid given Great Britain by the United States under the Mutual			
		ment equipment, equipment, (3)	nce Program can be applied to (1) research and develop- , (2) technical assistance for the overhauling of US type component parts, (4) engineering construction equipment, orces not committed to NATO.			
		military aid to I opportunity for i	Comment: For many months British officials to bring about a broadening of the criteria by which US Britain is determined. They probably see an immediate increased aid, pending the results of NATO studies, and at of any forthcoming requests for US economic assistance.			
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